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INTRODUCTION
Most economists in the classical liberal tradition associate with Adam Smith (1976, 208-9) by assigning only three duties to the government: "first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society." 2 To provide the necessary financial funds for implementing these duties, Adam Smith's system of natural liberty has to be completed by a set of fiscal rules or a fiscal constitution. Since the publication of the seminal book by Brennan and Buchanan The Power to Tax with the programmatic subtitle Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution ([1980] ; see also Brennan and Buchanan, [1977] ), the general conceptional ingredients for such a completion seem to be available. However, as known from the literature, applying operational criteria to limit government activities in a dynamic setting is not an easy task (see Inman, [1982 and 1987] ).
The fundamental constitutional approach by Brennan and Buchanan advocating several constraining principles for Leviathan remains somewhat controversial. Some economists subscribing to the theory of optimal taxation 3 argue that an implicit trade-off Hans G. Monissen 4 between overall efficiency and a smaller government sector size may be biased.
Avoiding a general discussion of this issue, we take a more pragmatic stance and consider the theory of optimal taxation at least as a useful starting point describing a "what-could-be" position. 4 The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, a simple choice-theoretic general equilibrium model describing government productive activity is presented. 5 The government supplies a public good which becomes effective as an infrastructure investment enhancing the productivity of the private sector. This type of government productive activity should be distinguished from the Keynesian view of the typical macroeconomic model in which the government activity remains not only unproductive but also welfare reducing if potential multiplier effects of government activity on employment are ignored. However, a government above a critical size will bring forth Leviathan who might appear in two quite different roles: he might materialize as a selfish dictator maximizing a surplus to be appropriated for personal uses or an anonymous bureaucracy trying to maximize the size of the budget. In supplementing the standard public-choice perspective, the model could rationalize efforts of "organized labor" to redistribute income in the functional sense from capital to labor by fixing the real wage rate at too high a level for overall efficiency. These efforts may lead to an excessive size of government over time.
Section 3 discusses the economic problem for a benevolent dictator under the perspective of the modern theory of optimal taxation. In addition to the infrastructure effect of the public good the model includes two private goods and a pure public good for our representative consumer. For this extended model the second-best tax structure is derived. These more technical aspects should complete the discussion in Section 2 and 4. In particular, Section 3 allows the formal computation of the Lindahl equilibrium included in Table 1 .
In Section 4, relying on a numerical example, the pattern of production and employment under competing objectives is evaluated for a benevolent dictator. This "first-best" solution provides the reference situation against which other objectives such as maximizing aggregate consumer surplus, national product or national income (private production) are evaluated. Section 5 deals with the effects of a budget-or revenue-maximizing bureaucracy with some interesting results for efficiency. The
Reflections on the Optimal Size of Government 5 simple model of Section 2 summarized in equations I and the one underlying the discussion in Section 4 and 5 regard a basic problem from two different angles. The first emphasizes more the productivity aspects and the second focuses mainly on welfare issues. Section 6 briefly summarizes the main results. Two supplementary appendices to Section 2 and 3 are included at the end of the paper.
2.
A SIMPLE CHOICE-THEORETIC MODEL DESCRIBING GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES The point of departure is a simple choice-theoretic model incorporating a representative private consumer and a complementary private firm. The role of government derives from the fact that a public good is included. This public good operates as an efficiency parameter in the production function for private output but, for the present, remains excluded from the utility function. In Section 3, the model will be extended to cover such a utility effect. The wage bill of the public sector has to be financed by taxes. The funds will be raised by imposing a proportional income tax. In deriving the structure of the model, special care is necessary to demarcate the functional role of the representative agent. As in all market systems the private agents are characterized by partial ignorance which allows to treat specific prices as parameters.
6
In socio-political models the representative agent frequently plays the dual role of a typical consumer in the market arena and a median voter driving the political process and controlling government activities.
7
It should be noted that a representative agent in a comprehensive sense does not need a government because he controls all resources and all instruments to maximize his private utility or, for that matter, the welfare of the economy with identical individuals.
We postulate a simple utility function with standard properties:
denotes the output disposable for the private consumption, R identifies the total time endowment available for work time, y w , and leisure, y.
The private budget constraint is defined as follows:
Hans G. Monissen 6 Gross wages, wy w , plus gross profits, , minus the tax burden define the disposable income for the economy which is large enough to buy the whole product if the government abstains from engaging in transactions which reduce this consumption potential. The first-order conditions are familiar:
The consumer treats the real wage rate, w, and real profits, , as parameters, thereby ignoring the fact that both magnitudes depend on his employment decision. 
The right side of the equation suppresses the term for the capital stock in the private sector which will be kept constant. The signs of the stated derivatives follow a priorireasoning where the signs of the public component could be switched to allow for a more pessimistic view of the economic role of government. Different from the procedure in Section 4, the effect of z on x is simply proportional.
Overall efficiency requires that a marginal shift of employment between the two sectors should produce the same effect on the private production level:
How is the efficiency requirement brought about? Without evoking a benevolent social planner the actions of the government have to be constrained by appropriate budgetary rules. Sufficient rules, as will be seen in a moment, are the imposition of an optimal tax rate and the requirement of a balanced budget to be defined below. Before the attention is directed to the government budget constraint the model has to be solved for w and  . These solutions are derived from the private business sector: or, more concrete, on a utility function which is quasi-linear in consumption.
The strictly concave term in leisure specifies constant relative risk aversion, a property which might be useful under an extended analysis covering uncertainty. The specific functional form has no essential bearing on our results, except that the profit term remains excluded from the labor market, which simplifies the analysis. Because the main objective of this section is to analyze a regime with an institutionally fixed real wage rate, the utility function remains incidental. Of course, the profit or wealth term could be removed from the model by restricting the private production function. This would, however, destroy the thread of the basic hypothesis of this section: It is Hans G. Monissen 8 "organized labor" which gains from a wage rate fixed at an excessively high level, thereby redistributing income from capital to labor.
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The implied solutions for the central variables are:
Equation 2.10 reflects our no-wealth effects labor supply function.
The decomposition of y w from the demand side is brought about by the government employment decision given profit maximization by the private firms. However, the labor market reflects the trade-off between real consumption and leisure. If this relation remains excluded, the government budget constraint becomes (2.12) and the employment level is restricted by
The following implicit relation specifies the more general case: Overall efficiency requires maximizing x p . Relying on the efficient allocation of the given working hours, the government budget constraint simplifies to
Equation 2.6 shows that the wage rate is equal to the marginal product of labor in the private sector. Because the labor supply, y w , is fixed, equation 2.8a can be rewritten as follows:
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In equation 2.8b the tax rate is introduced as a parameter and, as a matter of expediency, t As compared to a budget maximizing bureaucracy, the selfish dictator creates serious, uncontrollable welfare problems. At least in principle, Leviathan in the form of a budget maximizing bureaucracy could be tamed by appropriate fiscal rules (i.e.
assigning the optimal tax rate). In this case the self-interested bureaucracy is guided by an invisible hand to support the welfare of society. This information is compiled in Figure 1 .
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There is an important difference between our more general model and the special one discussed by Findlay and Wilson. If a consumption-leisure effect remains excluded, the government could set t  1 and confiscate the whole of the private production. In the general case, there is a well defined tax rate 0 1   t which maximizes government appropriation, i.e. Keynesian government expenditures or the budget surplus. We refer to our numerical illustrations in Section 4 and state without proof that the general case can be pictured in a qualitative similar way as in their model, which is condensed in Figure 1 .
Some interesting results can be derived from a partial structure of our model. These results have immediate bearing on the interpretation of macroeconomic processes and provide possible interpretations both on the size and the growth of the public sector.
The assumption is that the real wage rate is fixed at a level too high to support a welfare-maximizing equilibrium. There is no need to work with specific production functions. For the results to be derived only the usual assumption about the signs of the first and second derivatives are sufficient. Essential for the analysis is the fact that the profit share in the functional income distribution is a variable.
A linear approximation of the system yields: 
If the wage rate is set above the efficiency level, the marginal product of labor in the private sector is higher than the corresponding marginal product in the public sector:
In this range an increase in w will reduce private production, x.
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Because the model prevents the government from running a deficit and x g remains constant, the marginal tax rate, t , will adjust. Equation 2.18 shows that this rate will increase:
The change in disposable labor income can be calculated from a change in the net wage rate, w n , because the government guarantees "full" employment by hiring any excess supply of labor at the prevailing wage rate.
Using equation 2.18 we may write
Equation 2.20 yields a rather complex expression. We follow our intuition and state without proof that for a range of wage rates above the efficiency level an increase in the gross wage rate will lead to a corresponding increase in the net wage rate, too. This is indeed an elaborate argument for collective wage bargaining. A weaker argument, however, may be sufficient: Similar to the familiar wage-push theory of inflation, organized labor might initiate a wage-tax spiral over time. The argument will be reinforced if the government is allowed to run deficits and to shift the relative tax rate from labor to capital. These results and the thrust of the general discussion could provide evidence for the hypothesis that even if the median voter or an anonymous group of bureaucrats does not exercise power to affect the budget, organized labor, possibly in tacit or implicit agreement with the incumbent bureaucracy, may be the decisive group, determining the size of the budget over time.
Let us conclude this section by adding some remarks on the effects of changes in the other parameters of the model. An increase in R will produce higher employment levels in both sectors. These effects are neither equal nor proportional. The increase in private employment will produce an increase in private production. To finance the increased public employment level taxes must be increased. The qualitative information provided by the production functions, however, is not sufficient to decide in what direction the tax rate will change, given the endogenous increase of tax revenues provided by the higher tax base,
x.
Changes in discretionary government expenditures constitute pure economic waste because the level of private production, x, remains unaffected. Inspection of our system demonstrates that a change of x g has no effect on the employment levels y g and y p . The crowding-out of private expenditures by public expenditures will be brought about by an increase in taxes induced by a higher marginal tax rate.
The above stated results are the main implications of our simple model. An appendix included at the end of the paper describes alternative socio-economic arrangements derived from the basic model and focuses on Leviathan's activities introduced in two variants.
THE ECONOMIC POLICY PROBLEM FOR A BENEVOLENT DICTATOR
Utility is a function of two goods produced by the private sector, x 1 and x 2 , and a pure public good, z, produced by the government. The component u is a strictly concave function. Leisure, y, as in the above model is the difference between the total time endowment and the time supplied for work. The budget constraint for the consumer reads as
The private goods are produced by a representative firm and are available at competitive gross prices, p 1 and p 2 . Nominal profits, , plus nominal wages, wy w , define the income of the representative consumer. In our first model a proportional income tax specified the second-best tax arrangement. Given the fact that it is not possible to tax the time endowment, charging commodity taxes is the efficient second-best solution here.
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The consumptive optimum is described by two equations: Equation 3.6 defines profits whereby the net sales revenue is the product of the net prices and the quantities sold. The specific tax rates t 1 and t 2 are stated in terms of the number of numéraire units per unit of product sold. The productive optimum is described by two equations: The input requirement for the production of the public good which is under the control of the government is stated in equation 3.9:
The tax revenues are used to finance the production of the public good. The government budget has to be balanced, a fact which prevents the government from generating a surplus:
Market equilibrium is described by three equations, although by referring to Walras' law, only two are independent:
(3.11) -(3.13)
The model specifies twelve independent equations to determine twelve independent variables, if the nominal wage rate, w, is set equal to one and the tax rates are treated as policy parameters.
Given the utility function, the solutions for x 1 and x 2 have a simple form: We recall that x 1 and x 2 are determined by a first stage maximization process which allows to interpret the utility function in 3.16 as an indirect utility function. We also notice that the quantities in the budget restraint are replaced by using equations 3.14 and 3.15.
If  is introduced as an undetermined multiplier, the necessary conditions for the solution of the policy problem can be derived. Needless to say, the solution describes only a second-best optimum: Equation 3.17 reads as a modified variant of the familiar Samuelson condition for the optimal supply of public goods. Including z in 3.14 and 3.15 will effect the tax bases, which carry over to the last two terms in brackets. The multiplier  identifies the shadow price of the costs of producing the public good reduced by the above mentioned revenue effects. As illustrated by the numerical example in Section 4, this shadow price is greater than one. The net marginal willingness to pay is measured by the expression on the left side of the equation. The term in brackets on the right side adjusts the cost of producing the public good by the marginal net revenue induced by the increase in the quantities of the private goods caused by the larger quantity of the public good. The two other equations, 3.18 and 3.19, depict the so-called Ramsey-Boiteux conditions.
Because an income effect is not operating in the standard demand functions for x 1 and x 2 , the cross effects are symmetrical. This yields the following formulation:
Reflections on the Optimal Size of Government 15 (3.19a) Only if the two goods are unrelated, both in demand and supply, the simpler form of the inverse elasticity rule can be derived.
To relate the analysis directly to Section 2 and illustrate the argument by a concrete numerical example, some simplifications are appropriate. Because working with two private goods does not provide further insights, the analysis can be simplified here, too.
THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT UNDER COMPETING POLICY OBJECTIVES: SOME NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
By restricting the structure of the model to only one private good which remains earmarked for taxation, the Ramsey-Boiteux conditions are reduced to the following equation:
The simplified functional forms allow us to illustrate the qualitative analysis by working with a concrete numerical example. Given the structure of the model, the proportional (or flat rate) income-tax regime is equivalent to a value-added tax regime.
The latter in turn can be derived from our commodity tax on x.
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Our model will now be adjusted in such a way to allow for a direct computation of the reduced forms without starting in a possibly nonstractable way from the first-order conditions and transform the problem to a second-stage maximization problem. Because the functional form of the utility function is maintained, the profit variable materializes as an additive term in an otherwise log-linear system. In the following equation 3.5a
 1 will be set equal to one to keep marginal costs constant. In extension of the previous model the effect of z on the employment level in the private sector, y p , is subject to decreasing returns, i.e.  2 is larger than  1. It should be noted that the loss of generality caused by the following specification is acceptable because the qualitative characteristics are maintained: p 1 , the price of x, will be set equal to one. The wage rate, w, will be endogenously determined. As mentioned above, t denotes a marginal commodity tax rate (resp. a value-added tax rate). The equations 3.2a The remaining solutions can be derived by direct substitution into the equations of the system. Information and transaction costs may impose restrictions on the benevolent dictator, thus preventing him from pursuing a first-best optimum. Similar cost barriers will prevent the arrangement of a Lindahl-tax system. Financing the production of the public good by levying value-added taxes restrict the optimum to a second-best utility level, U sb . It might be the case that the benevolent dictator must content himself with more conventional goals such as national product (NP), defined as x wy g  , or national income (NI), recorded here as x.
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The above stated reduced-form equations apply only to cases of so-called non-firstbest solutions, where the representative consumer and producer are not charged the correct "price" for the public goods. A first-best solution or a utility maximum can be derived by maximizing utility subject to the resource constraints. The formal computation of a Lindahl equilibrium could follow the rules derived in the Appendix to Section 3. However, given the specification of the model, this equilibrium creates problems of interpretation: Introducing a competitive market for the public good will turn the private production function into one with increasing returns. This implies losses for the private firms. The public sector will earn profits. The sum of these two items which is positive should be included in the private sector's budget constraint.
To derive the second-best solutions, we proceed as follows: Given the definition of the policy goal under discussion, the reduced-form solutions in terms of the tax rate are substituted for the respective variables. Setting the first derivative equal to 0 allows solving for the respective tax rate and the policy variables involved.
The first three second-best policy alternatives should be evaluated against the ideal norm of the first-best solution or the Lindahl equilibrium. The solution values for these competing arrangements are stated in Table   1 . The numbers in brackets describe the case in which the productive effect of the public good remains excluded and only the utility effect is operating. The results of the simulations confirm what should be expected from a priori-reasoning: Social welfare or utility, U, is highest under the first-best or Lindahl solution. Maximizing NI instead of focussing on NP will reduce welfare. It may be surprising and may run counter to intuition that the level of employment distributed over the two sectors remains constant under all three second-best solutions. This result is the consequence of the specific form of the utility function and the fact that a profit term in the private sector budget constraint does not become operative. The employment level will be higher in the Lindahl equilibrium, which is equivalent to the first-best utility solution, because the privatization of the market for public goods generates profits as described above. Under the first-best utility solution the scarcity prices of the public good both for the consumers and the firms are implicitly included.
Given the constant level of employment under second-best solutions, the interesting aspect of the numbers in Table 1 is the distribution of employment and production over the two sectors. The higher welfare under the NP-goal as compared to the NI-goal is associated with a larger public sector, measured either by tax revenues, public good production or public sector employment. Maximizing national income directs production from the public good to the private good. Maximizing second-best utility, U sb , will reinforce this mechanism if compared to the NP-goal. Finally, a very important result should be noted: If the policies of the benevolent dictator approach the first best solution, the optimal and efficient size of the government will increase.
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However, to assess the consequences of the model appropriately, it should be made clear that the government materializes here in the role of a benevolent dictator and not in a Leviathan who will be analyzed in Section 5. Once more, our model incorporates a productive government should be contrasted with the standard macroeconomic model in which the government has no useful role to play. At least under full employment, the welfare-maximizing size of the government is simply zero.
The reduced-form equation 4.1 specifies a Laffer-type curve for x. As shown in Table 1 , this curve has a regular maximum at the tax rate 05 . 0  t (see row for NI in Table 1 ). A government maximizing tax revenues will operate on the Laffer curve-in the usual denotation-and thereby, as a typical monopolist, fix a tax rate in the falling range of the reduced-form equation for x. Under the specified parameter constellation, tax revenues are:
The first-order condition, 
GOVERNMENT AS LEVIATHAN
The benevolent (and efficient) dictator is the implicit role model of the more orthodox public finance literature. The results derived from such a model are not different from an extreme variant of a public choice model where an enlightened median voter is able to fully constrain the political process from the demand side. As in Section 2, it makes sense to contrast this case with a Leviathan government. Leviathan may either materialize as a surplus-maximizing dictator or a budget-maximizing anonymous bureaucracy. In this final section we concentrate only on this second variant.
It should be noted that the typical model of the literature, incorporating a revenuemaximizing politician-bureaucrat with standard reference to Niskanen (1968 and 1971) 17 , remains incomplete as long as it ignores the productive activities provided by the government. In order to prevent a so-called worst case scenario leading to a complete confiscation of private production, the familiar consumption-leisure trade-off will be retained. Including a production function for the public good in connection with the revenue-maximizing hypothesis reveals some surprising results for efficiency. The politician-bureaucrat, at least in a technical sense, is forced to be efficient in order to maximize tax revenues.
To illustrate the results, the standard microeconomic technique contrasting indifference relations with underlying restrictions can be used. A graphic analysis allows us to separate the behavior of a Leviathan bureaucracy from that of the benevolent dictator.
For the consumer-voter both the tax rate and the quantity of the public good are given parameters. A benevolent dictator will strive to maximize the private agent's utility function: , and , which will be discussed in a moment, should be ignored.
The efficiency line or restriction depicting the maximum level of the public good for any given tax rate is identical with the reduced form equation 4.2 for z. The efficiency line has a positive slope throughout, due to the fact that the demand function for x has unitary elasticity:
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Our simple hypothesis for the politician-bureaucrat is that he strives to maximize tax revenues:
Substituting the reduced form for z yields As shown in the last section-see equation 4.4-maximizing tax revenues results in a tax rate that is much higher than the one maximizing the Laffer curve for x. The quantity of the public good, z, associated with the revenue-maximizing tax rate t  0 51 . is 1.21.
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This solution could, of course, be derived by using standard indifference curves to be derived from the following utility function:
The substitution procedure parallels the one described above. Without further discussion we graph the government's indifference curves shown in Figure 3 . It certainly does not come as a surprise that the size of government under this hypothesis will be more excessive, thereby reducing utility or welfare. 
SUMMARY
In the preceding discussion we have tried to reconcile the neoclassical approach of optimal tax theory with a simple public choice model. The analytical basis for this attempt was provided by a general equilibrium model with a public good produced by the government which enhances utility and increases the productivity of the private sector. The public good is financed by levying optimal second-best taxes given the fact that the prevailing institutional arrangement prevents a first-best solution.
In Section 2, a simple choice-theoretical model was presented in which the public good operates only as a productive factor via the infrastructure thereby enhancing the productivity of the private sector. The income tax system operates as a flat income tax.
Given the optimal tax rate, the appropriate rule for a welfare maximizing dictator is to balance the budget. The same unintended social consequences are brought about by a budget-maximizing bureaucracy constrained by the same optimal income tax rate. The basic model proved especially useful in the modeling of alternative social arrangements:
e.g., if organized labor succeeds in fixing the real wage rate over the efficiency level, the marginal productivity in the private sector will increase both because the level of private employment will decrease and the level of public employment will increase. As the government is forced to pay competitive wages, this collective action leads to a redistribution of income from capital to labor, thereby increasing the size of the government. It should be emphasized that the model of a productive government could be reformulated without analytical difficulties to extend or to replace the typical Keynesian perspective of the standard macroeconomic models. Leviathan played either the role of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat or a surplus-maximizing selfish dictator.
In Section 3 the economic problem for a benevolent dictator was discussed from the perspective of the theory of optimal taxation. Because several private goods were included, the second-best tax system is one of distinct commodity taxes. If only one private good is available, a commodity-tax system can be easily transformed into a value-added tax system which under the structure of the model is equivalent to a proportional income tax system. This more technical discussion was used to derive some useful first-best conditions which are important for the institutionalization of a demand-revealing process or possible Lindahl-tax prices.
The main part of Section 3 was the analysis of alternative government arrangements based on a concrete numerical example where the public good operated both through the utility function of the representative agent and the production function of the private sector. The pattern of production and employment under alternative governmental goals was derived for a benevolent dictator. The "first-best" or Lindahl solution thereby supplied the reference situation against which competing goals such as aggregate consumer surplus, national product or national income could be evaluated. Rather surprisingly, the size of the government increased with government efforts to maximize welfare by establishing a more efficient tax rate. Subsequently, the behavior of an optimizing politician-bureaucrat was modeled according to a Leviathan perspective, whereby the relevant structural restrictions were consistently derived and not postulated in an ad hoc fashion. The excessive size of government in this case did not come as a surprise. A graphic illustration helped to elucidate the analysis and summarize the major results.
The deplorable fact of excessive (inefficient measured against optimal "social welfare") government size along an explosive growth path for almost all Western countries would certainly suggest the need for fiscal reforms on a constitutional level. 
